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In this article, I explore entanglements of Muslim sociality and informal livelihoods in 
Dar es Salaam. I propose that Muslim practices of affiliation deserve to be counted 
among the ordinary strategies that urban majorities employ to navigate the city amidst 
conditions of uncertainty. Building on Stephan Lanz and Martijn Oosterbaan’s (2016) 
work on “entrepreneurial religion,” I draw on fifteen months of ethnographic research 
in Kariakoo, a super-dense market district at the center of the city. The first part of my 
analysis explores associational life in Dar es Salaam, combining a historical overview 
with ethnographic description. I explore how urban actors use affiliations to football 
teams and political parties to generate livelihood opportunities and to secure protection. 
The second part of my analysis uses emic notions of “flags” (bendera) and “shields” 
(ngao) to demonstrate that Muslim modes of association operate in strikingly similar 
ways to those pertaining to football and politics. Engaging with the conceptual vocabu-
laries of AbdouMaliq Simone and Erving Goffman, as well as recent debates about 
“everyday” and “lived Islam,” this article foregrounds the interplay between religious 
forms and neoliberal processes of informalization as they are unfolding in African cities 
and beyond.[Tanzania; Dar es Salaam; Urban Religion; Muslim Urbanism; Informal 
Economy; Associational Life.]
Introduction
This article contributes to an emerging body of interdisciplinary work on urban religion and religious urbanism (Hancock & Srinivas 2008; Becker et al. 2013; Garbin & Strhan 2017; Berking et al. 
2018; Kuppinger 2019). Stephan Lanz and Martijn Oosterbaan (2016) 
have recently made a significant contribution to this research agenda 
with their innovative notion of “entrepreneurial religion,” which they 
propose has flourished as part of the “age of neoliberal urbanism” that 
we currently inhabit. Lanz and Oosterbaan (2016, 494) conceptualize 
Pentecostal Christianity and “middle-class” post-Islamism as entrepre-
neurial religions, meaning that they both can be seen to generate “par-
adigmatic neoliberal forms of organization.”1 More specifically, each of 
these movements is characterized by a “radically free-market organiza-
tional structure,” which, the authors argue, maximizes the “entrepreneur-
ial self-government” and security of their adherents (Lanz & Oosterbaan 
2016, 497).
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While their article marks an important contribution to this emerging 
literature, the symposium that it introduces restricts the scope of what 
Lanz and Oosterbaan (2016, 487, 497) call the “metropolitan religious 
mainstream” to this pair of explicit movements that have “broken away 
from their traditional cultural environment.” This is not to downplay 
the tremendous influence on urban worlds exercised by Pentecostal 
Christianity and post-Islamism, as their rapid global expansion continues 
apace; however, it strikes me that Lanz and Oosterbaan’s intervention 
can also help explain emerging urban-religious phenomena in southern 
cities that do not fall within the purview of Born Again Christianity 
or Islamic reform, but that are no less shaped by, or constitutive of, the 
social and regulatory landscape of neoliberal urbanism.
In this article, I investigate a metropolitan Muslim mainstream in 
Dar es Salaam that shares little in common with middle-class post-Isla-
mism. This is a very different kind of entrepreneurial religion—one that 
gives rise to a far more implicit and ephemeral type of religious organi-
zation. My analysis draws on fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork 
in Dar es Salaam, the entirety of which I spent living in Kariakoo, a 
super-dense market district at the center of the city (Figure 1). The data 
that appears in this article derives from my conversations with individual 
residents, my use of walking as a participatory research method, and my 
interactions at street-side gatherings called maskani, where men congre-
gate to discuss current affairs and consume refreshments.
There are two parts to the analysis. In the first, I examine the chang-
ing character of associational life in Dar es Salaam, combining a histor-
ical account of its transformation from colonial era to present day, with 
an ethnographic description of some prevailing modes of sociality in 
Kariakoo. Here I focus especially on the cohesions generated by football 
Figure 1. Everyday traffic on Narung’ombe Street, Kariakoo (Photo: George Gasto). [This 
figure appears in color in the online issue.]
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associations and political parties, attending to the political and economic 
shifts that have structured the transformation of these social formations. 
Bringing these two threads together, I then provide a concrete account 
of the social and economic productivity of these distinctive modes of 
sociality in Kariakoo, a neighborhood characterized by a notable con-
centration of informal livelihood activities. My particular interest in 
association football (mpira) is not only reflective of its social vitality in 
Kariakoo, but also the ways that residents constructed me as a mzungu 
(white person), and more specifically as a white British man. The modal-
ities of whiteness and foreignness that I encountered in Dar es Salaam 
made it difficult for me to talk directly with residents about religious 
matters but also they led people to (correctly) infer that I am interested 
in football. Over time, I came to appreciate how football could serve as 
an unexpected entry point through which to better understand contem-
porary dynamics of religious sociality in Dar es Salaam. Accordingly, in 
the second part of this article, I stage parallels between these non-reli-
gious forms of belonging and popular Muslim associational forms. What 
these comparisons are intended to demonstrate is that religious modes 
of sociality have undergone a similar process of transformation to those 
associated with non-religious markers of solidarity. Using two emic 
terms, namely “flags” (bendera) and “shields” (ngao), I provide a series 
of concrete examples that illustrate how, when taken seriously as every-
day urban practices, Muslim modes of association operate in strikingly 
similar ways to those pertaining to football and politics. I demonstrate 
that Muslim practices of devotion and affiliation deserve to be counted 
among the informal livelihood strategies by which inhabitants “navi-
gate the city”—how residents “cope, work together, deal with threats and 
develop opportunities, and invest their energies in the making of urban 
life” (McFarlane & Silver 2017, 458).
In doing so, I draw on three different research trajectories in addition 
to that of urban religion introduced above. First, I build on the innovative 
work of AbdouMaliq Simone (2001, 2004, 2008, 2010) on Muslim urban-
isms in districts comparable to Kariakoo in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Douala, Cameroon. Second, I take inspiration from a recent turn toward 
the “everyday” and the “lived” in the anthropology of Islam (Deeb 2015; 
Marsden & Retsikas 2013; Schielke 2010, 2018; Soares & Osella 2010). 
This research agenda conceptualizes the everyday as a site of contingency 
where “ethical strivings” informed by normative models of Islam encounter 
mundane practices, and where Islam rubs up against other “grand schemes” 
within people’s wider life-worlds (Deeb 2015; Marsden & Retsikas 2013; 
Schielke 2010, 2018; Soares & Osella 2010). Finally, I borrow from the 
conceptual vocabulary developed by Erving Goffman (1959, 1963, 1971) 
to explain the microdynamics of everyday encounters among American 
and British people in the twentieth century. Goffman’s manifest influence 
on recent writing about urban Africa has rarely been made explicit. The 
resulting analysis challenges existing research on urban religion and infor-
mal livelihoods, which has in both cases overlooked the interplay between 
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religious configurations and neoliberal processes of informalization as they 
are unfolding in African cities and beyond.
Flag Neighbourhood
Early on in my time in Dar es Salaam, I bought two pairs of brightly colored Adidas tracksuit bottoms from a street vendor. It quickly became clear that the color combinations that I had chosen—red 
and white on one hand, yellow and green on the other—are in fact 
associated with Simba Sports Club (Simba) and New Young Africans 
Sports Club (Yanga) respectively, the two most popular football clubs in 
Tanzania who are also “historic rivals” (watani wa jadi). By wearing both 
pairs of tracksuit bottoms on different days, I was inadvertently display-
ing my allegiance to both Simba and Yanga. Some of my acquaintances 
at maskani began to make innuendo-laden jokes about my fluctuating 
between sides. Eventually, having committed to taking Simba as my 
team, I felt the need to retire the green-and-yellow pair.
This anecdote is indicative of the tremendous impact that bright pri-
mary and secondary colors have on Kariakoo as a visual environment. 
More than any other neighborhood in Dar es Salaam, the color com-
binations that I chose when I bought my tracksuit bottoms (and to a 
lesser extent blue and purple) can be found on every surface imaginable. 
Banners bearing the names or logos of football clubs hang between build-
ings; restaurants decorate their walls with posters and framed pictures of 
players and mascots; stickers adorn shop frames, windows, and vehicles of 
all sizes. These colors have also come to represent European teams whose 
profiles have grown enormously in Dar es Salaam in recent decades. For 
example, red and white are representative not only of Simba but also 
the English football clubs Manchester United, Arsenal, and Liverpool. 
At one major intersection of Kariakoo, two brothers own shops facing 
one another, both of which are painted red: one is decorated with the 
Manchester United logo and has above its doors the name of their sta-
dium, Old Trafford, with the other featuring the Liverpool crest and the 
name of their ground, Anfield. In more recent years, a relative of the 
brothers has opened a store nearby with the words “Man City” written 
over the door frame.
These bright colors are an integral element of what Peter Lambertz 
(2015, 42) calls an “infrastructure of distinction.” Urban actors use these 
colors to performatively draw material lines of social difference between 
humans and non-human objects (Lambertz 2015, 42). The anecdote 
about my tracksuit faux pas illustrates how color, as a sensory surface, 
performed difference and distinction on my body. In other words, the 
act of wearing a color provides a very simple way by which an individual 
can embody aesthetic difference. My red tracksuit bottoms, in the words 
of my informants, were my flag (bendera), and so it might be said that 
urban actors in Kariakoo become flags through such practices.
the act of 
wearing a 
color provides 
a very simple 







In the months preceding the October 2015 presidential election, 
even though effectively the same color combinations were in use, they 
began doing something different: they now performed a material line 
of distinction along political affiliations. It became perfectly common-
place for a Simba fan to display their support for Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM—Tanzania’s dominant ruling party) by wearing green-yellow, or 
indeed for a Yanga fan to display their support for the primary opposition 
parties, Chadema and the Civic United Front (CUF), by wearing red, 
white, and blue. While this would occasionally lead to some confusion 
about precisely what kind of flag a given individual was, it did not deter 
people from displaying their colors. Where I observed that women are 
generally less likely to wear football colors than men, this was most cer-
tainly not the case with respect to political colors, with many women 
buying dera gowns emblazoned with party colors and logos from Kariakoo 
shops. Street vendors experienced a roaring trade in what resembled a 
conference ID pass containing an image of the wearer’s favored presiden-
tial candidate. The “pass” was strung on a lanyard that would correspond 
to the party’s colors and would be worn around one’s neck.
It was particularly notable at this time that CCM flags could be found 
on virtually every surface, from shop fronts to vehicles to garments. My 
research collaborators explained that these flags were not necessarily 
indicative of voting preference, serving rather as shields (ngao) that were 
protecting individuals or spaces from unwanted attention or suspicion on 
the part of the dominant ruling party. The logic here is that law enforce-
ment agents who may target the homes, shops, and stalls of residents are 
less likely to do so if the inhabitant or proprietor is a supporter of the 
ruling party. Accordingly, CCM colors were emplaced in a more “fixed” 
fashion than those of the opposition parties, which were somewhat “itin-
erant.” For example, motorcycle taxi (bodaboda) drivers would parade 
through the streets flying Chadema flags behind them, sounding their 
horns as they passed.
Before addressing the social productivity of this infrastructure of dis-
tinction as it takes place in Dar es Salaam, I first want to contextualize 
its emergence with reference to the changing character of associational 
life in Tanzania over the past century. As the birthplace of both Simba 
and Yanga football clubs, as well as the Tanganyika National Union 
(TANU), which later became CCM, I focus especially on the Kariakoo 
neighborhood.
Associational Life
In the first half of the twentieth century, urban centers across East Africa were undergoing rapid population growth as a result of rural-urban migration. At this time, Dar es Salaam experienced a flourishing of 
associational life centered around the Kariakoo neighborhood (Callaci 
2017, 117). In accordance with racially segregated programmes of 
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colonial planning, Kariakoo was, during these years, the principal res-
idential neighborhood for the city’s African population (Brennan & 
Burton 2007). There emerged what David Anthony (1983, 156) calls a 
“distinctly urban consciousness,” which “conceived the world in terms 
of dance societies, football associations, trade unions, [and] political 
groupings”; a list to which could be added Sufi tarika, churches, and 
“tribal” associations. The British colonial administration tolerated such 
groups because they were seen as an important means of integrating rural 
migrants into urban life, of governing so-called wahuni (hooligans), and 
of delivering social services (Mercer et al. 2008, 112). In addition to being 
social clubs where diverse people could exchange news and participate 
in discussions, these organizations typically had a formal structure and 
management committee: they “collected subscriptions, organized burials, 
helped members to find jobs, accommodation, and even arranged mar-
riages” (Brennan 2012, 66–67; see also Ranger 1975, 93; Tsuruta 2007, 
201). In the decades leading up to independence, associations as diverse 
as trade unions, dance societies, football clubs, and Sufi tarika were 
instrumental to the rise of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) 
and its successor, the Tanganyika National Union (TANU) (Nimtz 
1980; Askew 2002, 95–96, 100; Tsuruta 2007, 203–204). These organi-
zations were used to great effect to mobilize Tanganyikans across ethnic 
divides, to raise funds, and to nurture new leaders (Glassman 1995, 165; 
Geiger 1997, 58; Said 1998, 183–185; Askew 2002, 95–96). Associations 
also provided an effective cover for political meetings at a time when the 
colonial government was resisting such movements (Said 1998, 184).
From the end of British rule in 1961 and up to the present day, the 
formal associational life of Dar es Salaam, and Tanzania more broadly, has 
diminished considerably. There are two principal reasons for this. The 
first has to do with the onset of state socialism in Tanzania and its legacy. 
Before the transition to independence, TANU had endeavoured to cap-
ture the energies and “moral obligations” of associations, and to redirect 
them toward the cause of national unity (Bjerk 2015, 49). Following an 
overwhelming electoral victory in 1960, TANU increasingly sought to 
restrict the autonomy and activity of associations as a means of consol-
idating power and monopolizing “economic, political and social space” 
(Dill 2009, 722). It did this using a variety of techniques, “stripping some 
groups of their power, excluding others from politics and folding oth-
ers into the state apparatus” (Paget 2018, 11). In the case of Christian 
and Muslim organizations, TANU warned against the dangers of mixing 
religion and politics in order to discourage any forms of collective polit-
ical participation based on religious identity (Westerlund 1980). The 
eventual demise of state socialism in Tanzania saw the emergence of a 
neoliberal phase in the mid-1980s following an internationally adminis-
tered programme of political and economic liberalization (mageuzi). Yet 
despite its return to a multi-party political system, Tanzania has not wit-
nessed the kind of resurgence of popular participation in associational 
activity that many expected to accompany these liberalizing reforms. In 
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other African countries, social actors “endured at the periphery [of par-
tisan politics] and returned with their mobilizational powers intact” to 
oversee the transition to multi-partyism (Paget 2018, 13). In Tanzania, 
however, social actors that were not permanently eliminated remained 
“mobilizationally diminished” or “excluded by norms of political neutral-
ity,” leaving TANU to control the transition to multi-partyism (Paget 
2018, 13). While Dar es Salaam has in recent decades seen a proliferation 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organi-
zations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs), these have typi-
cally failed to build large or representative membership bodies, and the 
enduring legacy of single-party rule has meant that these have tended to 
bypass the state entirely in order to solve their own problems or to secure 
transnational assistance (Dill 2009, 724, 739). Muslim FBOs have been 
exposed to particularly close scrutiny from the state with respect to their 
links with transnational organizations (Gilsaa 2015, 53).
The second reason that the formal associational life of Dar es Salaam 
and Tanzania has diminished in recent decades relates to changing pat-
terns of employment in Dar es Salaam amidst neoliberal programmes of 
restructuring, and in particular a growing reliance upon informal liveli-
hood activities on the part of residents. As Nelly Babere (2013) demon-
strates in her historical overview of the informal economy in Dar es 
Salaam, while informal livelihood activities first began to see real growth 
in the 1940s, it was not until the 1980s and the onset of an economic 
crisis that the proportion of informal operators began to outnumber 
those in formal employment. By 2006, almost three in five households 
(57 percent) in Dar es Salaam were dependent on informal livelihood 
activities as a means of generating income (Babere 2013, 104). In the 
first decade of mageuzi, local authorities had been more accommodating 
toward informal economic activity, but from the early 2000s to the pres-
ent day, traders operating in public spaces have faced increased pressure 
to be registered and licensed, and have been subject to routine crack-
downs and evictions from prime locations (Brown & Lyons 2010, 41–2; 
Babere 2013; Bahendwa 2013, 155; Msoka & Ackson 2017; Steiler 2018; 
Malefakis 2019, 19–29). In addition to the largely ineffectual nature of 
regulatory interventions, the wider governance challenges surrounding 
the informal economy in Dar es Salaam are further complicated by low 
levels of participation in operators’ associations: the membership bodies 
of these organizations are poorly representative of the operators most 
exposed to difficult circumstances, and they have done little to resist the 
eviction of informal vendors from prime locations by city police (Brown 
& Lyons 2010, 34–35; Babere 2013, 273).
As in other urban settings across the African continent and beyond, 
these dynamics of precarity and informalization are fundamentally reor-
dering associational life in Dar es Salaam (Lewinson 2007; Tripp 1997). 
In response to these pressures, informal networks of traders in Dar es 
Salaam are increasingly characterized by a certain “fluidity,” and even a 
“near invisibility” (Brown & Lyons, 2010, 42; Malefakis 2019, 5). These 
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emergent groups are very different in form to the associations that were 
so prevalent in Dar es Salaam during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and indeed the NGOs and CBOs that have proliferated in recent 
decades. Rather, they more closely resemble the kind of “loose-knit, 
ephemeral social formations” that AbdouMaliq Simone (2001, 102) has 
identified in several cities across the African continent. These highly 
mobile platforms can serve as “effective vehicles for balancing [the] 
divergent, yet interconnected needs” of often very different residents 
(Simone 2001, 113). They permit urban residents to pursue very specific 
objectives through provisional collaborations, but “without a sense of 
owing anything [to one another] or having to align agendas” (Simone & 
Pieterse 2017, 104). In an urban landscape increasingly characterized by 
profound uncertainty, these dynamic social forms enhance the capacity 
of residents to come together and improvise responses to unfolding sit-
uations while also keeping one another “at arm’s length” (Ogawa 2006: 
33-34). Because these associations demand far less investment and fewer 
obligations than the more formal types of organization described above, 
residents are able to establish a greater number of “belongings” in order 
to maximize opportunities to connect with strangers. This often entails 
the creation of a series of “fake dichotomies, oppositions and potential 
choices” of affiliation that “in fact spring from an extremely limited 
number of options” (De Boeck & Baloji 2016, 114). Not only is the 
shifting associational life of Dar es Salaam more ephemeral than it had 
previously been then, it is also more fragmented: as Kate Meagher (2010) 
articulates in the context of Nigeria, livelihood networks are increas-
ingly “defined by an individual’s portfolio of ties, rather than by collec-
tive arrangements,” arguably serving to “exacerbate rather than reduce 
vulnerability” (Meagher 2009, 2; Marks & Stys 2019, 5–6).
Despite the stark disjunctures that exist between these informal net-
works and the associational life of 1950s Dar es Salaam, some of these 
“new relational webs” actually redeploy these longstanding cultural forms 
and social identities in experimental ways (Simone 2004, 7, 24). This is 
most clearly apparent in the case of football. Where football clubs had 
previously operated with formal structures and had provided financial 
assistance to their members in times of need, these associational forms 
have been retooled in ways that reflect the economic transformation 
that Dar es Salaam has experienced in recent decades. As such, they 
have become a far more ephemeral (though no less important) feature of 
the urban ecology, as I now go on to show.
Recognizing Strangers
In a conversation about the ongoing struggles between local authorities and informal retailers in Dar es Salaam, one of my friends provided the following account of the more implicit dynamics of these livelihood 
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activities as they play out between street vendors, shop owners, and 
police in the streets of Kariakoo:
The police are asking why [informal business operators] are roaming 
everywhere; why they are standing on street corners. These people 
dress well, they eat on time, they have money, even a car. How? What 
happens is that they work closely with people who own shops and 
buildings, including renters. They know where is free to rent, who is 
a thief, who a new person is that might be a danger to the area, where 
a car parking space might be free.... They try to establish a kind of 
friendship with the owners of a business, to bring them information, 
new deals, new sales, to know new buyers, which products are on top. 
They are also working with the police.
This is a perfect illustration of the way that the livelihoods of informal 
business operators in Dar es Salaam depend on forming ad hoc collabora-
tions with other urban actors. In their efforts to decipher what is taking 
place in the neighborhood, to acquire “business-critical” information, 
residents are compelled to make themselves recognizable to one another. 
The infrastructure of distinction which is characteristic of Kariakoo 
needs to be understood in the context of this wider politics of legibil-
ity. In other words, urban actors “become flags” as a means of acquiring 
visibility.
As an illustration of the social productivity of this infrastructure of 
distinction amidst dynamics of precarity and informalization, consider 
how one of my closest research collaborators, Fundi Chomba, would 
introduce new people to me. “This is Mr. Wanja, member of CCM and 
strong supporter of Yanga,” he might say, or “This is Mr. Juma [NB reli-
gious identity is implicit in his name], he is conservative Simba like me, 
but has no other ideology.” Over time, I realized that by itemizing the 
associational “ties” of each individual in this manner, Fundi Chomba 
was providing me with a platform for further exchange insofar as we were 
able to position one another within “a specific moral or aesthetic uni-
verse” (De Boeck & Baloji 2016, 115). Clearly not every urban actor in 
Kariakoo has the luxury of a third party like Chomba to provide such 
a concise introduction to the strangers they encounter, but my point 
here is that color works in precisely this way in Kariakoo: in a materi-
ally and sensually congested environment, color operates as a succinct 
itinerary of one’s moral and aesthetic “coordinates.” Implicit practices 
such as these are highly valuable in neighborhoods like Kariakoo because 
they allow urban actors to generate mutual recognition without being 
“slowed down by explicit formulation of ideology or verbal meaning” 
(Elyachar 2011, 96). By becoming flags, strangers become immediately 
recognizable to one another, giving many visitors to the district the false 
impression that everyone in Kariakoo knows everyone. On the contrary, 
it is notable just how impersonal these forms of knowing one another are, 
presenting a very minimal and generalizable set of social coordinates, 
and therefore ensuring that residents are able to remain at arm’s length 
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from one another and the social obligations entailed by more intimate 
relationships (Figure 2).
More than granting them a degree of anonymous legibility, by 
becoming flags, urban actors are also provided with a certain format or 
“script” for interaction—one that can be used to generate a “temporary 
co-presence” (De Boeck & Baloji 2016, 121). For instance, on one occa-
sion in Kariakoo, a crowd of young men were directing suspicion at Fundi 
Chomba and I. Becoming alert to this, Fundi Chomba quickly identified 
that one of the young men was a Yanga fan and let out a cry of “Yanga 
oyee!” The man responded with a begrudging nod and a grunt. Though 
this man was a total stranger to us both, the color of his football shirt 
allowed him to be recognized without any extended interaction. Despite 
being an ardent Simba supporter, Chomba used this minimal set of coor-
dinates to stage a form of solidarity with the man. While this was no 
doubt a rather weak display of solidarity, it was sufficient to overcome 
the atmosphere of hostility that he had detected because it obliged the 
young man to reciprocate. On another occasion, Fundi Chomba had 
accompanied my friend George and I on a walk around Kariakoo as we 
were taking the photographs that accompany this article. At one point 
during the day, a man wearing a Yanga shirt asked us sternly why we were 
taking photos. This time, Chomba batted the man’s question right back 
at him, joking that he “does not deal with” Yanga supporters. This imme-
diately diffused the situation and the man backed off. In other words, by 
invoking a playful antagonism toward the Yanga supporter, Chomba suc-
cessfully generated a sense of social distance between him and our group.
In both of these cases, the men wearing the Yanga shirts provided us 
with a script for interaction, one that offered us a platform with which 
Figure 2. Unfocused interaction and connective infrastructure at the trade entrance to the 




we could stage similarity or difference. These practices are not only rel-
evant to football but also affiliations to rival brands, rival music artists, 
rival political parties, rival nationalities, and so on. In a neighbourhood 
that is constantly steering itself into a web of mutually exclusive belong-
ings, one can be, so to speak, either with or against every individual 
that one encounters. Accordingly, residents in Kariakoo are, as demon-
strated by Fundi Chomba, highly sophisticated at tactically introducing 
and withdrawing moments of solidarity with people on the basis of their 
multiple flags.
In what follows, I propose that we attend to how religious identities 
are being incorporated within the infrastructure of distinction that has 
been elaborated, providing another layer of horizontal ties. To this end, 
I demonstrate two ways that Muslim modes of association bear a strik-
ing resemblance to those of football with regard to their socioeconomic 
productivity amidst dynamics of neoliberal urbanism. First, I show how 
urban actors use Muslim social platforms to open up new avenues of eco-
nomic collaboration and material support; and second, I consider how 
they can keep people at arm’s length. In doing so, I raise the question 
of how religious forms and identities are being redeployed by emergent 
livelihood networks in Dar es Salaam.
Muslim Flags
As an introduction to some of the ways in which “being Muslim” in Dar es Salaam is bound up with processes of urbanization, consider the following quote from Omary, one of my friends and research 
collaborators, on the dynamics of rural-urban migration:
In Kariakoo, people are town-dwellers. All of those that come to Dar 
es Salaam adopt this lifestyle. It doesn’t matter where you come from, 
people are the same here; there is a general behavior [...], the behav-
ior of the cities [tabia ya mjini]. Everyone has to find something to be 
recognized in the city [in order] to cope. They buy certain clothes, a 
phone, get a new way of talking. There are certain values associated 
with cities. It’s believed that to be in town, you have to be like X, Y, 
and Z. The good side of city life is that sometimes when we fail, we turn 
to God. People come to the city and fail in everything, and then they 
start working with the Bible and Koran. Islam is the easiest way to live: 
you turn to God, and then your fellow Muslim can give you shelter and 
money.
Religion here, and particularly Islam, is framed within the terms of a 
prevailing urban “lifestyle” or “behaviour,” which Omary sees as char-
acteristic of Dar es Salaam. Omary very explicitly indicates that being 
Muslim serves as a channel for rural-urban migrants to access “shelter 
and money.” What I want to stress here is that the operations of Muslim 
networks of sociality and channels of material support are, no less than 
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football allegiances, predicated on acquiring a certain legibility in the 
city—in the words of Omary, the necessity of finding “something to be 
recognized in the city [in order] to cope.” Just like being a supporter of 
Simba or Yanga, being Muslim is an exclusive form of membership that, 
when expressed through dress practices or “a new way of talking,” bestow 
on an urban actor a particular recognizability in a congested urban envi-
ronment. As a means of fleshing out these parallels between religious 
and sporting modes of affiliation in Dar es Salaam, I want to reflect on 
how Omary’s observations about dress practices relate to residents of 
Kariakoo, where the dress practices of urban actors are more recogniz-
ably Muslim than anywhere else in the city. Most academic commen-
tary on Muslim dress and fashion, both in the African continent and 
beyond, has been focused on dress practices among Muslim women, and 
especially on practices of veiling (e.g. Moors & Tarlo 2013; cf. Schulz & 
Diallo 2016). In what follows, I dwell particularly on the dress practices 
of men in Kariakoo who, as in most prime locations for informal activities 
in Dar es Salaam, far outnumber women operators (Babere 2013, 282).
The two garments worn by men that are most associated with Islam 
in Tanzania are the kofia cap and the kanzu tunic. The loose-fitting kanzu 
is in some respects impractical for those whose work in Kariakoo is phys-
ically intensive. However, a number of people told me that in recent 
years, it has become more common to see young people in Muslim dress 
not only at Friday prayer or at festivals but also on an everyday basis, with 
those traveling to Kariakoo from the suburbs making a conscious deci-
sion to do so (see also Hirji 2004, 77) (Figure 3). While this reassertion 
of visible Muslim identity is partly attributable to the shifting terrain 
of religious politics in Tanzania, it also relates to the productivity that 
Muslim modes of association have acquired, particularly among informal 
business operators.
As was seen above in relation to the wearing of football colors, 
Muslim dress practices facilitate certain kinds of interaction between 
urban actors in ways that assist them in forming ad hoc collaborations. 
For example, when my friends were dressed in a kanzu, I found that they 
were more likely to be greeted with the salutation assalamu alaykum from 
people in the street. These exchanges would typically be delivered with 
a degree of playful grandiosity, being peppered with honorific titles such 
as ustadh and shaykh. As articulated by one man that I interviewed, the 
kanzu quite literally “attracts greetings from others,” affording the wearer 
a heightened social “exposure” (Goffman 1963, 125). While people 
already familiar to my friends would go out of their way to greet them in 
this manner, those who knew them only in passing would also be more 
likely to do so. These kinds of “passing greetings” are a good example of 
what Erving Goffman (1971, 73, 76) calls “maintenance rites”—a min-
imal type of exchange that serves to reinforce a social bond between 
acquaintances; however, I also observed that Muslim dress generates a 
platform for heightened social access between total strangers in Kariakoo 
(Goffman 1971, 79). Muslim salutations can operate as what Goffman 
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(1963, 105, 129) calls a “relationship wedge,” providing not only a 
“license to approach” a stranger but also a potential scope for social or 
material claims. As is the case with visual displays of football affiliation, 
Muslim dress offers as an explicit grammar for interaction, whether this 
develops into a brief expression of mutual recognition or into a more 
protracted social encounter.
These cultural practices of greetings do of course have theological 
underpinnings: as a number of my interlocutors reminded me, the Prophet 
Muhammad instructed Muslims to greet not only fellow Muslims but 
“whoever they meet” by saying assalamu alaykum. Fundi Chomba would 
often quote a hadith, which reports that on the day of Eid, the Prophet 
Muhammad would return home from prayer by using a different route 
from which he came. As someone who practices this not only on Eid 
but on a daily basis, I found it revealing that Chomba’s interpretation of 
this hadith was that this would maximize opportunities for the Prophet 
to greet people.
On the one hand then, mutual displays of greeting can be understood 
as “social-recognition rituals,” which present a specific way of being 
together in Kariakoo (Goffman 1971, 75). In the words of one of my 
friends, Hassan, “When we greet each other, you are putting your mind 
close to my mind, and it means that I’m ‘someone’ to you.” He added 
that, “Greeting makes the brotherhood between Muslims stronger.” On 
the other hand, however, the tactical use of greeting is also a crucial 
competency insofar as it serves as a way of getting to know another’s 
situation (hali), as a public display of social capital, and even as a means 
of getting assistance. For example, Fundi Chomba advised me that “It 
Figure 3. Pedestrians wearing Muslim garments, football shirts, and knitted caps bearing 
Chadema party colors mingle on Sikukuu Street (Photo: George Gasto). [This figure appears 
in color in the online issue.]
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is very important to use greetings when seeking something you want or 
fixing a problem. In Kariakoo, people can rob you and no one will save 
you, but if you say ‘Habari za leo?’ [How are you today?] and ‘Assalamu 
alaykum,’ people will be pleased with you and will assist.”
These insights complement AbdouMaliq Simone’s (2010, 146, 151) 
analysis of Muslim practices of sociality in Bangkok where, by sustaining 
“the minimal identification of themselves as Muslims,” Islam serves as 
an “instrument for a collaborative entrepreneurship”—a “way in which 
individuals can align themselves and coordinate their lives with each 
other.” Insofar as it attracts greetings, the kofia and the kanzu offer peo-
ple in Dar es Salaam another means by which they may become a flag. 
Residents that wear Muslim dress or adopt a recognizably Muslim com-
portment are participating in a particular act of “being Muslim,” through 
which they acquire a distinct legibility and heightened exposure in the 
urban environment. This legibility grants them access to a grammar of 
social interaction that they and others can key into in order to tactically 
align themselves with diverse people and objects. Indeed, many residents 
choose to display both religious and sporting forms of membership simul-
taneously, wearing Muslim garments in combination with football colors 
and thereby increasing their social exposure (Figure 4).
To be very clear, the ties under discussion do not entail the compara-
bly thick kind of social trust that Neil Carrier (2016, 180–184) describes 
as characteristic of Somali Muslims that work in the Eastleigh district of 
Nairobi; they are far more ephemeral, along the lines of the loose social 
formations already discussed (see also Malefakis 2019, 67–78). No less 
than other kinds of social identity in Dar es Salaam then, to be Muslim 
in the manner that I have described is to make use of this identity as what 
Figure 4. Men wearing football shirts and different styles of kofia as they participate in different 
business activities next to the Kariakoo Market complex (Photo: George Gasto). [This figure 
appears in color in the online issue.]
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AbdouMaliq Simone (2008, 80) calls a “device” or “node” of “absorption 
and deflection,” one that that serves to steer urban actors in particu-
lar directions and into contact with particular people. In what follows, 
I want to pick up on this notion of deflection and explore how being 
Muslim can serve as a device through which urban actors may tactically 
distance themselves from people and objects.
Muslim Shields
While my research collaborators speak about flags in reference to the aesthetic markers of one’s affiliation (be it political, religious, or sporting), the term can also be used in a pejora-
tive sense. More specifically, flags are people that merely follow prevail-
ing norms with an eye to their personal interests at a given moment, but 
with no real commitment to a viewpoint or ideology. A Swahili proverb 
used by Fundi Chomba helps to illustrate my point: “A flag follows [the 
direction of] the wind,” (Bendera hufuata upepo). While the proverb can 
be used to mean many things, Fundi Chomba has invoked it as a political 
criticism of what he sees as the capriciousness of Tanzanian citizens with 
respect to their loyalty to a political party or principle—his point being 
that they are easily led, whether by popular opinion, fear, or the promise 
of personal gain. The same sentiment may also be applied to Muslim 
flags, as defined in the foregoing discussion, with the attendant sugges-
tion that those who exhibit their Muslim identity through dress practices 
are primarily motivated by economic rather than devotional concerns.
Several of my friends expressed to me that they consider the kanzu 
and kofia to be poor indicators of whether someone was a good Muslim 
or not, or indeed Muslim at all, with many Christians choosing to wear 
a kanzu in order to “look distinguished” (see Hirji 2004, 77–78).2 As one 
of my friends emphasized:
Most who dress in a kanzu and kofia do so to identify as a Muslim leader 
or scholar, but inside [ndani] they have nothing. Anyone can enter a 
shop, buy a kanzu, and look like a shaykh when wearing one, but so 
many of those who do can’t answer a single question about Islam.
Along similar lines, Fundi Chomba alluded to this discrepancy between 
Muslim dress and behavior using another Swahili proverb: “Behavior is 
not like clothing, it is not easily changed” (Tabia siyo nguo, haibadiliki kwa 
urahisi). He further elaborated on this in his own words:
Islam is not about wearing a kanzu or kofia, it is about walking in a 
straight line and having good behaviour. [...] If a believer wears Islamic 
garments, he or she is announcing that they follow the ways of the 
prophet. They are expected to be more decent and friendly and trust-
worthy and peaceful; to be good in everything. The kanzu used to be 
a peaceful garment, an “honest person” [mwaminifu] garment, so if you 
City & Society
16
are people who lie or do forbidden things, why are you wearing one? 
Why are you speaking loudly and telling the world, “I’m a Muslim”? 
All people of bad behavior are wearing a high quality kanzu. It is like a 
shield [ngao] for them so they appear like a nice person.
I want to elaborate here on this notion of shield as Fundi Chomba uses 
it. This term was earlier encountered in reference to the context of the 
2015 presidential election, when political flags were seen to protect in-
dividuals or spaces from unwanted attention or suspicion. In Kariakoo, 
there are clear parallels here between the shield-like operations of polit-
ical posters on the one hand and kanzu robes on the other.
Several of my friends shared Fundi Chomba’s impression of the kanzu 
as a shield but in two markedly different senses. The first is that the 
kanzu serves to protect the wearer from himself; it restricts “bad” behavior. 
One man put it as follows:
You can’t wear a kanzu and ask a lady for a date. A kanzu brings respect 
to you. A certain type of person won’t do these kinds of things at this 
time of day wearing this kind of clothing; won’t talk to you with a 
swagger.
A young Muslim interlocutor said something very similar:
To wear a cassock or a full Islamic outfit can change you. Even me, I 
am only Abdallah, but if tomorrow I wear kanzu every day, they will 
call me Shaykh Abdallah. Those that wear a kanzu prohibit themselves 
from bad things. The kanzu is supposed to be accompanied by this habit 
and this other habit is prohibited.
Especially interesting was the fact that Fundi Chomba suggested that to 
enter a bar or to swear in the street while wearing a kanzu serves to “put 
down the kanzu and not you.” In other words, while “what you have 
judged on your own” is not generally seen as anyone else’s business, the 
real concern would be that one was denigrating the kanzu itself. These 
statements betray a conscious sense on the part of some residents of the 
agency of the kanzu as a moral actor in Kariakoo, as well as the respon-
sibilities owed to the garment by other subjects that participate in the 
same social ecology.
The second way in which a kanzu can be described as a shield is 
that it serves to secure the wearer from evil. As Fundi Chomba put it, 
“To wear a kanzu is like a protection (ulinzi), no matter which type of 
kanzu.” Chomba’s intended meaning here concerns moral and spiritual 
protection. However, my observation is that in precisely the same way, 
the kanzu can not only heighten the social exposure of a wearer to some 
types of encounter, but also serve to deflect unwanted interactions by 
restricting his accessibility among other types of individuals or situations 
(Goffman 1963, 104, 125). For instance, one man told me that he “likes 
to wear a white kanzu because [...] with any color, people are easy to 
connect to you; any sins will be very easy to connect to you.” This idea 
of colors being used to facilitate connections and generate social distance 
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tallies well with the foregoing discussion of football and party politics, 
shedding particular light on the material properties specific to Muslim 
garments as “prosthetic” extensions to the body (Gandy 2005, 29). 
Indeed, beyond merely deflecting other urban users, the kanzu can even 
serve to shield the wearer from the unwanted attention of law enforce-
ment agents. Earlier it was seen that, since the early 2000s, unlicensed 
informal traders in Dar es Salaam have been increasingly exposed to the 
risk of forcible eviction from prime locations or arrest by police on behalf 
of local authorities. One of my friends explained that “If a police patrol 
meets a man without a kanzu, they can be called and interrogated, yet 
if they do wear one the police will say, ‘Oh, this is an ustadh [Muslim 
honorific title] so we won’t take him in.’” In other words, men garbed 
in Muslim costume are engaged in the performance of a social role that 
obliges them to maintain an impression of moral piety befitting a dis-
tinguished Muslim figure (Goffman 1959, 8–9) (Figure 5). Accordingly, 
police would think twice about targeting them in their crackdowns since 
such an interaction could be construed as manifestly unwarranted or 
even discriminatory.
A further reason why the kanzu operates as a shield in this manner 
relates to the fact that Kariakoo is home to a particularly pronounced 
number of Friday mosques (Misikiti wa Ijumaa), in the vicinity of which 
Muslim-coded garments, such as kanzu and buibui, are typically sold. My 
conversations with residents revealed that mosques have long served as 
a legitimate alibi for urban actors in Kariakoo who are forced to account 
for their presence in the city. In other words, when pressed for their 
reasons for being in the Kariakoo neighborhood, an unlicensed trader 
who is recognizably Muslim would be able to feasibly claim that they are 
Figure 5. Men trying on kofia in front of Mtoro Mosque as pedestrians wearing Muslim dress 




in the district to perform swala (obligatory daily prayer). Indeed, these 
urban sites have acquired a further political sensitivity since 1998 when, 
at a mosque in the nearby Mwembechai neighborhood, two people were 
shot and killed by state police in riots precipitated by the arrest of a 
senior Muslim cleric (see Kirby 2017). Because it grants access to this 
infrastructural assemblage of informal business activities and mosque 
complexes (see Kirby forthcoming), it might then be argued that being 
Muslim provides residents with a more effective means of resisting atten-
tion from police than belonging to operators’ associations.
Conclusion
While the historical intersections between Islam and commerce in East Africa and the wider Indian Ocean region are well documented, it is striking that contemporary entanglements 
between Muslim modes of sociality and informal livelihood activities in 
the region have received so little critical attention, particularly at a time 
when these intersections appear to be intensifying. One reason for this 
is that commentators generally tend to privilege normatively religious 
settings, activities, and modes of self-presentation when researching reli-
gious people, rather than reading these within the wider context of their 
everyday lives, or indeed taking seriously more marginal or implicit prac-
tices that may still be associated with religion (Larkin 2016; Schielke 
2010; Soares & Osella 2010). This is particularly true with regard to mat-
ters of business and economic activity, which, as Simon Coleman (2013, 
206) shows, are not typically considered to have anything to do with reli-
gious practice—a supposition that derives from the influence of ascetic 
forms of Protestant Christianity on European and North American per-
ceptions of what is constituted by “proper religion” (Kirby 2019). Even 
when research on urban religion does bring these different domains into 
consideration, religion is all too often framed within terms of “meaning 
and hope” offered to “impoverished urban residents seeking solace and 
comfort” (Murray & Myers 2006, 11). In other words, the importance 
of religion in the associational life of urban Africans is restricted to the 
moments of redemption and spiritual or social communion that they 
provide; a mere compensation for an “urban politics of disappointment” 
(Simone 2013, 160). In this article, I have instead sought to approach 
religious practices of devotion and affiliation as numbering among the 
kind of background competencies by which residents come to “see and 
feel similarity,” and to render urban worlds intelligible (Simone 2013; 
Larkin 2016; Coleman & Vásquez 2017). Joining Julia Elyachar (2011), I 
have sought to look beyond consciously performed embodied practices or 
techniques of the self and instead to the “tacit gestures” and “locomotory 
bodily practices” that co-constitute urban space and communities.
In Dar es Salaam then, as in many other African cities, longstanding 
modes of sociality are transforming in response to intensified dynamics 
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of informalization and precarity, which have accompanied neoliberal 
urbanism. The associational life of the city has become more ephem-
eral and fragmented, being increasingly geared to providing opportuni-
ties for establishing loose economic collaborations with fellow residents. 
Emergent livelihood networks often operate under aesthetic markers 
which are borrowed from an earlier era of associational life, most nota-
bly in the case of football teams. These cultural forms are redeployed as 
part of a broader infrastructure of distinction through which, using bright 
colors and specific dress practices, people become flags for their foot-
ball teams and political parties. By situating these social dynamics in the 
broader context of informal business, I have shown that these practices 
are valuable because they allow residents to recognize other people who 
share the same urban environment in a minimal way, providing a plat-
form for them to generate temporary co-presences with strangers, which 
do not entail any sustained mutual obligations. Equally, these practices 
can also be used in order to tactically withdraw moments of solidarity in 
ways that remain impersonal and widely legible to other residents.
Building on this analysis, I have demonstrated that Muslim sociali-
ties are being reordered in strikingly similar ways to other forms of asso-
ciational life in Dar es Salaam, and particularly those relating to football 
teams and political parties. First, I considered the flag-like dimensions of 
what it means to be Muslim in Kariakoo, examining how urban actors 
increasingly use dress practices to engage in acts of “being Muslim,” which 
open up new avenues of economic collaboration and material support. 
In other words, being Muslim grants urban actors access to an expanded 
horizon of possibility with respect to what they can do with fellow resi-
dents. Second, I addressed the shield-like qualities of Muslim modes of 
association, showing how residents can also employ characteristically 
Muslim dress practices in ways that tactically generate social distance 
from others, most notably in the case of law enforcement agents who par-
ticipate in crackdowns on unlicensed traders. I suggest that the enduring 
plausibility of Muslim affiliation amidst these social transformations is 
partly attributable to its remarkable dynamism within Kariakoo as an 
urban milieu, and its capacity to be incorporated among the informal 
strategies through which residents navigate the city. Pentecostalism and 
post-Islamism, the forms of entrepreneurial religion in which Stephan 
Lanz and Martijn Oosterbaan (2016) are particularly interested, are 
very much present in contemporary Dar es Salaam; however, I propose 
that this “metropolitan religious mainstream” that I have identified in 
Kariakoo is no less imbricated with the trajectories of neoliberal urban-
ism in which these authors are interested. When read alongside a broader 
turn towards the everyday and the lived within the anthropology of Islam 
then, Lanz and Oosterbaan’s theoretical intervention can also help to 
explain the emergence of more ephemeral forms of religious association.
More broadly, my analysis raises questions about the ways in which 
religious forms and identities are being deployed by emergent livelihood 














the same conditions of precarity, deriving from parallel processes of infor-
malization, are increasingly characteristic of cities across the world, we 
may find that comparable configurations of religious urbanity are emerg-
ing in other urban sites (Mbembe & Nuttall 2008, 4). As such, address-
ing these questions will contribute to efforts to understand and plan for 
our shared urban futures.
Notes
Acknowledgements. In the process of writing this article I benefited from 
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1 Following Asef Bayat (2007), post-Islamism here is taken to mean 
a Muslim movement that can be distinguished from Islamism in its 
attempt to “fuse” religiosity with democratic and secular values such as 
rights and freedom, prioritizing “sober work in place of [delivering] a rev-
olutionary blow” (Lanz & Oosterbaan 2016, 495).
2 Shahab Ahmed (2016, 435, 447) convincingly argues that these 
dress practices should be conceptualized as “Islamic” (rather than “cul-
tural,” “Islamicate,” or “secular”) not only because garments like these 
are recognizably “Muslim,” having been produced by “Muslims acting 
as Muslims,” but also because these practices transform the body of the 
wearer by bringing it into an “Islamic field of meaning.”
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